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Akron Law Review
THE IRANIAN CRISIS:
WHO SHOULD DO WHAT?
AN ADDRESS* BY ROGER FISHER**
HANK YOU. It is good to be here. I will try to do my duty to Law Day
as well as talk about Iran.
Those of us in the conflict business - particularly the international
conflict business - have hold of a growth industry; we have something
really going for us. Each year around the first of May, we look to the
law; we remind ourselves about it. As an international lawyer I often hear
rather skeptical comments, not just from students, but also from diplomats,
generals, and bureaucrats. They see the international troubles of the world.
They look at Iran and Afghanistan, at the Arab-Israeli conflict, at what's
going on in South Africa and elsewhere, and, knowing that I am an inter-
national lawyer who is trying to make the world work a little better, they
are likely to say, "Boy oh boy, do you have a problem." When I hear that
phrase or something like it, I am reminded of an incident that occurred
in World War II.
I was a weather reconnaisance observer in a B-17, a four-engine "fly-
ing fortress." We had lost an engine which had been replaced in New-
foundland. It was on a beautiful day that we were testing that new engine.
The pilot, who was somewhat of a clown, took us up to some fourteen thou-
sand feet and, just for a lark, feathered the other three engines to see how
the new one would do by itself. That wasn't so bad because a B-17, empty
and stripped down, could fly for a while on one engine, but then, to make
the joke a little more fun, he feathered the fourth engine. For a brief
moment we were suspended in silence with all four propellers stationary.
As the flying fortress glided (something like a rock) toward the hills of
Newfoundland, the pilot quickly pushed the button to unfeather the pro-
peller (to put the blades back into the wind) in order to start the engine.
At that point and only then did he remember that in order to unfeather
a propeller you needed power, and that in order to have power you had
to have at least one engine going. As the plane zoomed lower and lower,
and as we were buckling on our parachutes, the co-pilot burst out laughing.
He turned to the pilot and said, "Boy oh boy, have you got a problem."
*This address was delivered in observance of Law Day at E.J. Thomas Performing Arts
Hall on the campus of the University of Akron, April 28, 1980.
**Williston Professor, Harvard University Law School; A.B., Harvard University, 1943;
L.L.B., Harvard University, 1948.
1
Fisher: The Iranian Crisis
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1981
AKRoN LAw REviwV
When people talk about international law that way I think that we
are like the crew of that B-17. We are in this together. If international law
doesn't work, we are all in for a crash landing.
Those of us who are primarily concerned with international law tend to
hold onto our rules as some theologians hold onto the Ten Commandments,
saying, "We must preserve these for future generations. If only people had
sense they would follow these rules." As international lawyers we tend to say to
the States of the world: "You ought to comply with international law. You are
naughty if you do not comply with these rules." That approach does not work;
we are not likely to get very far simply by lecturing statesmen and telling
them to be good.
Let me share with you the kind of advice I give to a government. Last
week I talked with people in the Pentagon, in the White House and in the
State Department about international law. I did not tell them they were
naughty (although some of them are); I tried a somewhat different angle.
The basic message is that law, particularly international law, is best under-
stood not as a restraint on behavior that keeps a government from doing
what it wants to do in furtherance of its national interests. Rather law is
best seen as a set of tools for advancing those interests; for helping a
government get what it wants. Law is not saying, "You can't do it"; rather
it is saying, "Here is a way that will help you do it better."
Let me clarify that proposition. I will try to illustrate it with the
current situation vis-a-vis Iran.
If law is going to serve our purposes, we have to know what those
purposes are. A statesman is like a poker player. Suppose you showed up
in New Guinea and wanted to play a poker game. You are not quite sure
of the rules, but you have three kinds of interests. Your first interest is
to win the hand. You want what you want when you want it; you want
victory. Your second interest is to be in a good position for future hands.
You do not want to lose all your chips on one hand, and you do not want
to ruin your reputation. You want to have a certain amount of clout that
can be used in future events. A poker player, like a statesman in Iran or
Afghanistan or in the United States wants to have the ability to influence
the future; he wants power. Then, whether he thinks about it or not, that
poker player has a third interest. He does not want too much disruption.
All his winnings-all his chips-won't amount to much if someone kicks
over the table and sets the house on fire. He wants peace. These three in-
terests, victory, power, and peace, are omnipresent. You cannot say, "I
want only one," or "One comes first" and ignore the others. The thing
that makes international problems difficult, and makes our own problems
difficult, is that we have to worry about all three all the time.
We tend to think that our primary purpose in Iran is to win. We
(Vol. 14:1
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want to get the hostages back. No. If that was our primary purpose we
could have achieved it within a day or two. The President could have
kidnapped the Shah, put him in a strait jacket-perhaps added Henry
Kissinger in a strait jacket-and with the two of them, could almost cer-
tainly have negotiated a swap for all the hostages. No. We were not about
to give the Iranian students what they wanted because we had two other
interests. One was the interest in international order-in peace. We were
also concerned about the reputation of the United States. We did not want
to go crawling on our knees saying, "Please give us our citizens back."
Our first interest was in the rules of the game: not to have diplomats
seized and held for extortion. Our second was in the reputation of the
United States, our power. Third, consistent with those interests, we wanted
to get the hostages back. The hostages are there today because we value
principles more highly than their return. Countries sometimes forget that.
The media sometimes makes it hard for us to remember what we are trying
to do.
Now with each of these three kinds of interests we can use the law
in two ways. The law can help us formulate what it is we are trying to do,
and the law can help us do it. The law can help us pursue our purpose
as well as clarify what that purpose is. The first and most important use
is to help us understand what we are really trying to do, to help us clarify
our interests. Law can help a statesman; it can help any of us clarify our
interests. Nothing condemns us to failure as certainly as formulating an un-
attainable objective. The key to success is to formulate a goal that we can
attain.
Let's look at the peace objective. In Iran what is our peace objective?
International order. What do we really mean by that? It is too late to avoid
the damage. Clearly the embassy was sacked and hostages (American diplo-
matic and consular persons) were seized. We cannot undo that. In domestic
law when governments break the law, what do we want to have happen?
What do we mean by "respect for the law" after Congress has passed an
unconstitutional statute or after an Ohio policeman has broken into and
entered a pawnshop without a search warrant? At that point, what is our
goal? We cannot undo the damage that has been done.
The law helps. It suggests to us that we do not punish Congress for
passing unconstitutional statutes. The federal government does not even
bomb Ohio when it violates the Constitution. We rarely take military action.
When we are dealing with governments, we do not rely on punishment.
Essentially we say, "Do better tomorrow." We try to get a cease-and-desist
order, a restraining order, or enjoin an officer from doing something again.
When a policeman has acted unlawfully we say, "You may not profit from
that activity; if you illegally seized evidence you may not use that to get
Summer, 19801
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a conviction." We adopt a forward-looking objective. We do not try to
punish states or to teach them a lesson not to pass unconstitutional statutes.
We do not say, "Hey, we are going to take punitive action against you
until you stop passing unconstitutional statutes." We just say, "Straighten up
and fly right in the future."
In Iran our basic peace objective, international order, is to see that
extortion does not work. It is to see that the holding of diplomats does not
successfully produce things which they could not have gotten by legal
means. We do not want to yield to blackmail. There is a virtue in forming
our objective that way. If we say that our "peace purpose" in the Iranian
case is to see that they do not succeed by coercing us, that is a fine pur-
pose because it leaves success in our hands. They are trying to coerce us
and we can say, "No you can't." We can have our way as long as we do
not yield to blackmail. On that issue we can decide. And on that issue the
world is with us.
One of my former students, the Bolivian Ambassador to the United
Nations, turned out to be the President of the Security Council in November,
when the hostages were seized. I spent two or three days in New York. It
was great to see how many diplomats agreed that diplomats should not
be taken as hostages. You have never seen such unanimity of opinion. The
Soviet ambassador, the Chinese ambassador, Third World ambassadors
and United States diplomats were all agreeing that if there is one thing
that is outrageous, it is to seize diplomats and hold them as hostages.
Further, the Iranian students not only picked on diplomats, but their de-
mand was to return a head of state. There is one thing heads of states
agree upon. All heads of state are future former heads of state; they think
it is a bad idea to send former heads of state back for punishment.
In November, we thus had the world with us. We were relying on
principle. We were strong in moral stance and we were dividing the Iranians.
They were dubious as to whether they were doing the right thing. In prin-
ciple, Iranians were opposed to holding political prisoners. Islamic friends
were asking them if they did not know that the prophet once said to a
man, "I could kill you for what you have done, but you are an emissary.
Therefore, you may go free." That story is well known in Islamic tradition.
Many Iranians worried about what they were doing. So as long as our
objective was to see that there was no profiting from extortion or blackmail,
we were in a strong position. Unfortunately, we have tended to move away
from the peace objective to the victory objective. We have moved away
from the question "Can they coerce us?" where the answer was in our
pocket, to the objective "Can we coerce them?" They now hold the answer
in their pocket. We have given them the power to decide.
Without reference to law we often formulate our objective as being
[Vol. 14:1I
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to teach somebody a lesson. It is extremely difficult to teach governments
lessons: Try teaching Alabama or the Ohio state governor a lesson; try
to teach North Viet Nam a lesson; try to teach the United States a lesson.
We tried in Viet Nam to teach lessons. It was a very expensive exercise,
and it is not clear that either side learned much from the process.
Regarding our second objective, having power, can law help us formu-
late what it is we wish to obtain? Here we are concerned with reputation.
In the Iranian case we are not going to end up with more planes or tanks;
we are concerned with how we look as a country. If we do not pay attention
to law, we are likely to adopt a stance illustrated recently by Mr. Safire
in the New York Times or Dr. Brzezinski in his television performance on
Sunday. Each saw the critical aspect of our reputation as being to look
tough-to have the reputation of being harsh and ruthless: "Boy, are we
military; don't mess with us."
We can do that. I was in Europe at the time of the Mayaguez incident.
Cambodians detained the Mayaguez and its crew. President Ford and Mr.
Kissinger decided to use the occasion to prove how tough we were. They
attacked the wrong island (the crew wasn't on that island) and a helicopter
crash killed more than twenty Americans. The United States had no ef-
fective communications with Cambodia; the attack was launched after
Cambodians had told the crew they were free to go. We were trying to
show the world we were tough; we looked incompetent.
The President's action was popular in Kansas, maybe in Akron; but
we were doing this to convince our foreign friends, and it did not go over
very well in Europe. I was driving that week from Rome to London and
read the Swiss, French, and London papers. Our friends, the conservative
papers (Le Monde, The London Times) were saying, "Don't judge the
United States by this incident. This is an abberation. They will never do it
again. They are not usually this irresponsible; they usually behave much
better. They certainly wouldn't do it in Europe; don't be frightened; they
are not really trigger-happy. We must stand by them. They just lost a war
in Viet Nam. We have to be very understanding and tolerant; please ignore
what they are doing in Cambodia; it doesn't really represent the United
States." Our left-wing friends, of course, were saying, "This is what you
expect from a super power run amuck." And we were supposedly doing
this to win friends abroad.
I do not think that the reputation of looking tough is what we really
want. We do not want to look just as ruthless as the Soviet Union. The
battle for the world is largely a battle for ideas. The Soviets are peddling
the very attractive doctrine of Marx: "from each according to his ability;
to each according to his needs." The truth is that they cannot deliver the
goods; the truth is that the Soviet Union is a highly controlled military
Summr, 1980]
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society. Those who want us to look equally tough would have us look like
Stalin. I would rather look like Thomas Jefferson; less like Attilla the
Hun and more like Lincoln. Anyway, we aren't very good at looking
ruthless. It turns out that when we do something, we don't like being
that bloody. In Viet Nam we didn't like photographs of children burned
by napalm. We didn't like military reports of destroying villages in order
to save them. We are not very good at being that nasty. We shouldn't
try to compete in that league. Let's let the Soviet Union win the reputation
for being the most brutal.
Law helps us understand what we really want to be like. We have a
government under law, freedom under law. The quality that makes this
society an ideal, a goal for many in the world, is our law. Freedom, con-
stitutional rights, human rights and liberty-that's why people want to be
with us in this country. That's why they come. It is not because our gov-
ernment is tougher or nastier; it is because we are better. If that is the
kind of reputation we want at home, if that is the kind of reputation that
appeals to ourselves, it is also a reputation that appeals to others in the
world. We can be lawful. Here again it is in our power to decide. We
cannot prove that we are more powerful, more brutal, than any other
country, but we can prove that we respect principles. We can succeed
in showing our respect for international law. That is up to us. If we formu-
late our objective that way, we have a chance.
Our third objective, of course, is victory, to win. How should we
formulate "win"? We want the hostages released. Is there anything more
than that? Yes, we do not want Iran under Soviet domination. We want
the Islamic world to be at least neutral and not to be anti-American, not
to be aligned against us. We would like Iranian oil production up; we
would like the Iranian society to function successfully, to have their economy
and politics work. In short, victory for us is not just an adversarial triumph.
In fact, if the attempted rescue operation had worked and somehow,
miraculously, the United States had extracted fifty-three Americans from
Tehran, what would our relations have been with Iran? Would Iranians
have come back the next day and said, "Now let's do business," or would
they in response have invited in the Soviet Union? Would we have alienated
that major country on the Persian Gulf? Would we, by humilitating them
in that way have driven them to take anti-American positions? The concept
of "win" is one we have to look at carefully. Victory for us on this fragile
planet is not just adversarial triumph; it is not just putting somebody else
down. To some extent we are married to our neighbors, all the other coun-
tries on the globe. In that context we have to examine what winning means.
About fifteen years ago I was playing frisbee with my son in Hyde
Park in London. We were playing catch. Apparently, no one in London
[Vol. 14:1
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had ever seen a frisbee. A group of Englishmen gathered to watch this
strange sport as we sailed the frisbee back and forth. Finally one Homburg-
clad Britisher came over and said, "Sorry to bother you. I've been watching
you a quarter-hour. Who's winning?" The Britisher knew that sports are
win-lose; they are all zero-sum games. Some of us still think international
affairs are that way. I wish I had been quicker that day in Hyde Park and
ask him if he were married. If he had said yes, I would have asked, "Who's
winning?" If you ask that question about a relationship, you are not doing
very well.
Winning in the Iranian case does not just mean extracting the hostages;
it means having things work out. It means solving their problems as well
as our own. It implies both the release of the hostages and a solution that's
just for the Iranians, a solution where they also get what they are entitled
t--no more than that, but they do get what they are entitled to. It is not
just putting them down.
It is a British legal tradition that "The Crown wins every case in
which justice is done." The same is true internationally for us. We win
if justice is done. We do not win by imposing an injustice.
Those are our goals. Law helps formulate each of them in ways that
make them more obtainable and more clearly understood. Law thus serves
our own interests, not just by restraining our behavior, but by helping us
understand what we are trying to do.
When it comes to pursuing our goals, again the law may help. There
are three kinds of ways we can pursue our objectives. One is by changing
the world's attitudes, its perception, its knowledge, by proving something
or by setting a good precedent. Essentially we are affecting what people
think. We are not trying to produce an immediate decision, but just to
affect how others think. I call that education.
The second way a country can pursue its objectives internationally
is through the exerting of influence. Again we are affecting people's heads,
but this time we want them to make a decision. We want them to decide
something they have not yet decided.
The third way is self-help. We go out there and do it ourselves, phy-
sically.
All three methods are relevant to the Iranian case. Let me illustrate
that. So far as the international-order objective is concerned, clearly we
cannot do that with hardware. We cannot go out and physically make the
world work better with tanks and helicopters. One way to make the world
work better is through "education," set a good precedent, give people an
idea, have people use their heads. How can law help us obtain this in-
Summer, 1980]
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ternational objective? Law can help us obtain this objective by our recog-
nizing law as a standard which limits what we do. It is a standard of
justice. As I say, we want justice. Our notion of victory is justice for both
sides. Recognizing that, we can begin to have a standard for what Iran
gets and for what we get. Both should be determined not by coercion, but
by law.
We are going to have to negotiate in some form with the Iranians. In
fact, we are negotiating now, but rather crudely, as though we were using
smoke signals in a high wind. At some point we are going to have to recog-
nize that there are two problems. There is our problem and there is their
problem. Once we sit down side by side to solve both problems, I am sure
we can do it.
Sitting down side by side to solve both problems means that we have
to have some standard for a solution. If they say, "Please give us the Shah,
please take all the money that was taken by the Shah and return it to us,
please help set up a kangaroo court to try the Shah, please do this and
please do that," we have to know how much to do and how much not to
do. The best standard we can have in that context is law. If we do not
adopt a legal standard, then anything we do is simply coerced from us and
we are paying blackmail. On the contrary, we should emphasize law. We
should say, "All right, we will give you whatever you would be legally
entitled to without the hostages. You get nothing extra for them. The oc-
casion of your taking the hostages provides the occasion for our getting
together, but you get nothing extra for them. In fact, what you get is
going to be months later than it would have been."
With Iran, we are essentially in what I call a "parent's dilemma."
Maybe enough of you are parents to know that when a small child smashes
a crystal vase and says, "I want my supper now," you've got a problem
on your hands. You cannot give him his supper right now, but neither
can you starve him to death. It is in the parent's interest to get the child
fed at some point, and the question is what to feed him and when. The
advice is standard. For punishment, send him to his room until supper
time or maybe a little bit later; then make sure he gets nothing extra for
supper that he wouldn't have had anyway. If it is cold cereal with spinach,
(perhaps a little bit colder than it might have been), fine. But you can't
say, "I won't give you anything," or that, "I am terribly sorry; you win;
you get supper." We're saying, "No you get nothing extra for smashing
the crystal vase; nothing extra for that; you just get what you would have
gotten anyway."
Similarly, we should tell Iran, "You have had six months punishment.
Now you get nothing extra for seizing hostages. You get what you would
have gotten if you had asked for it. We will cooperate in tracing funds
[Vol. 14:1
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that belong to the government. The courts are open. We will unfreeze
the trade that wouldn't have been frozen if you hadn't done this. We will
remove the sanctions, buy the oil we would have bought earlier, nothing
else. You are not being rewarded for your bad behavior." Law as a standard
permits us to govern what we are doing. It lets us give something without
giving too much. If we do not have that standard we are stuck.
As for our reputation, clearly we want the reputation of being law-
abiding: we pay attention to the law. The United States admirably went
to the Security Council and to the International Court of Justice. The
court issued an interim order (I should say technically, indicated provisional
measures) and the final decision of the case of The United States v. Iran
is expected to come down about the 25th of May, in which presumably
Iran will be held governmentally liable for having supported what the
students did in smashing the embassy and holding hostages.1 The interim
order asked Iran to release the hostages, and the interim order, in para-
graph B, said neither side should take any action which might aggravate
tension in the area. The United States is now trampling on its reputation
for law-abidance a little bit by ignoring that part of the order of the court.
Our lawyer stood up in court two weeks or so ago and said that the
court had ordered that we not increase "tension," but, what we are doing
is increasing "pressure." Therefore we are complying with the order. I
do not think it is a very plausible argument to say that when under an
order not to aggravate tension we can threaten military action and increase
sanctions consistent with that order. We have another theory: that we
do not have to comply with the order as long as Iran is not complying
with the order. That argument is weakened by the fact that Paragraph A
said that Iran should release the hostages and Paragraph B said that if
they did not, then pending the release, both sides should refrain from
tension-producing action. It is hard to say that Paragraph B does not con-
tinue to apply-despite Iran's defiance of Paragraph A.
We also damage our reputation for being a law-abiding country by
unilaterally engaging in military operations of the kind we did with our
rescue attempt. There is a case that could be made for it. My international
law class tomorrow afternoon will discuss self-defense. Under the United
Nations Charter we undertook to make no use of force, except in self-
defense in response to an armed attack. Can we wait six months and say
that we are now responding in self-defense against their armed attack and
that our means are appropriate? I would think that if that question were
I On May 24, 1980, the International Court of Justice, in a unanimous decision, held that
Iran was in violation of international law by continuing to hold the hostages, and in a
near-unanimous one, "ordered the immediate release of all American hostages held in
Iran, told the Iranians not to put any of them on trial and ruled that Iran was liable for
reparations." N.Y. Times, May 25, 1980, § 1, at col. 6, at 10, col. 2.
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submitted to the International Court of Justice, we would lose. Basically,
law can help us but we have got to pay attention to the law if we want
the kind of reputation of which we and other countries are proud.
Turning to our goal of victory, we tried last week to get this by self-help.
We tried going in with helicopters and planes. It was difficult, and we failed.
It is hard for us to judge how likely it may have seemed to those who were
in on it, but I am afraid that they were all committed to the project. I have
seen a series of such "self-help" failures: we failed in the attempt to get
prisoners out of North Viet Nam, we failed in the Mayaguez, we failed
in the Bay of Pigs. Now we have failed again.
Those like the United States who are rich and powerful tend to believe
that there is a military solution for every problem: that if only we have
the will and are prepared to pay the price, we can solve every problem by
military means. Fortunately or unfortunately, it is not so. We cannot make
the world work with military hardware. We cannot pump oil with tactical
nuclear weapons. It cannot be done. We have got to work with people.
You know that in your family, with your spouse and your children, in a
village or town or city or country. You can't go around and make things
work by just being tough. The same is true around the world; there are
very few things you can do simply by self-help, by physically doing it.
We are back to influence. The only way we can now get the hostages out
of Iran (part of the victory we want) is to influence the decision they
are going to make.
Put yourself in the shoes of a student militant, either in November,
or a week ago. Suppose one student says, "Hell, this is getting nowhere.
Let's release the hostages; this serving three meals a day and guarding
fifty people twenty-four hours a day is beginning to wear. We have had the
publicity, the TV cameras are no longer giving us the time of day. Let's
let them go." How would you answer? Wouldn't you say, "Well maybe,
but first what is going to happen to us when we do let the hostages go?
What is the United States going to do? Are they going to punish us?" In
January, President Carter said that releasing the hostages would not wipe
the slate clean. The Pentagon has said that they have a number of options,
some of which could be carried out as punitive measures after the hostages
are released. I can tell you that in Tehran every student knows that the
United States has some punitive military options. They fear that as soon
as the hostages are let go and we are no longer worried about their lives
we will then take punitive action.
If we want to influence Iranians, we have to look at the choice the
way they see it. Construct a balance sheet. From their point of view, it
must look something like this:
(Vol. 14:1I
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IRAN'S CHOICE
If we release the hostages: If we hold the hostages:
- We look weak. + We look strong.
- We back down to the United + We stand up to the United
States. States.
- We get nothing. + We get TV coverage.
- The U.S. may take punitive + We may get the Shah or at least
action against us. some of his money.
Sanctions continue.
BUT:
+ We can always negotiate
some kind of a deal.
+ We keep our options open.
Who is irrational? It is those Americans who think it makes no sense
for Iranians to hold the hostages. It may have been a bad idea at the be-ginning, but once they took the hostages it makes no sense to them to
release them until they have some assurance about what is going to happen.
Sanctions are wholly ineffective except in contrast with something better.
If we say, "As long as you hold them you get hurt," we then have to say,
"If you let them go, better things will happen." For example: "We will
accept the revolution; sanctions will stop; funds are going to be unfrozen;
we will cooperate in dealing with claims; we may help you locate some
money if the Shah really took some (at least you will have access to the
courts); and we will stop harassing Iranian students." Whatever it is, we
are going to do some things for them, with them, or at them, after the
hostages are released, things which presumably are more attractive than
sanctions. The most powerful thing we can do to influence Iran today is
to identify what those things are, and to try to convince them credibly
that in fact that is what is going to happen.
We notice how poor their credibility is. They have a separation of
powers that beats our own. We are upset when President Bani-Sadr makes
an agreement that is overruled by Khomeini. But we ought to be a little
more sympathetic. Remember that President Carter signed the SALT Treaty
only to have it held up by the Senate. We should understand. We are
accustomed to dealing with nice attractive dictators like President Sadat
and King Hussein. We like dealing with one man rulers. We make an
agreement and there it is. It is all done. But the rest of the world has to
deal with us. They make an agreement with the State Department only to
discover that Congress won't appropriate the money, or the President says
no, or we have an election coming up, or the newspapers are on their
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necks. Well, Iran is like the United States only more so. We have to be
somewhat tolerant of their problems.
Our credibility with them is also very bad. They do not believe a
word we say. Last week's rescue attempt will do nothing to improve that
credibility.
We are going to have a tough time wrapping a package up. It is going
to challenge us lawyers to work out a deal. My current suggestion is that
we wrap the package up and make a commitment to the Secretary General.
We say, "Okay, we are authorized to tell you that upon release of the
hostages, the following things will happen: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. We reserve the
right to withdraw this commitment after consultation with you, but in the
meantime it is on the table." Let the Iranians have a simple yes-no decision.
Then their internal divisions become their problem, not ours. Let's let them
figure out how to say yes, knowing with some confidence what will happen
if they do.
In all these ways, law is a tool to help us accomplish our task. But to
make it work we need public understanding. We need lawyers who are
prepared to see both sides of a case. We need citizens who are able to
understand our long-term interest in keeping the game going and in not
having the table kicked over, as well as our short-term interest in winning
this particular hand. I think it is worthwhile on Law Day to come back
and say that this is not just matter for lawyers, it is a matter for all of us.
Now something like thirty minutes ago, I left you rapidly descending
from fourteen thousand feet in a B-17 over Newfoundland. I owe you an
explanation. We didn't crash. I wasn't killed. While the co-pilot was laugh-
ing at the pilot's problem, somebody else did something. Back behind
the bomb bay we had a buck sergeant flight engineer who remembered
that we had a putt-putt generator to use if we landed in Northern Greenland
where there was no plug-in electric power to start the engines. While we
were getting our 'chutes on, he went back, wrapped the rope around the
fly wheel, tickled the carburetor, adjusted it, and got the generator started.
Before any of us had jumped out, we had power on the plane and with
power the pilot was able to unfeather the engine. It was not the pilot's
solution, not the co-pilot's solution. Somebody who didn't think about whose
job it was made the crucial difference.
Making international law work, making sense out of our relations
with Iran, helping the public understand the need for balancing international
order and nationalism is not just the Secretary of State's job; it is not just
the President's job; it is not just a job for those in office; it is a job for
all of us. Anyone can make a difference. Different people can make a
difference at different times. Any of you can make a difference. And if
you do, then instead of saying, "Boy, have you got a problem," we can all
say, "Boy, have we got ar opportunity."
[Vol. 14:1
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